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Fortney: Collaborative Divorce

COLLABORATIVE DIVORCE: WHAT LOUIS BRANDEIS
MIGHT SAY ABOUT THE PROMISE AND PROBLEMS?
Susan Saab Fortney
If you ask legal ethics scholars what they remember about
Louis D. Brandeis’s judicial confirmation hearings, most would point
to the manner in which he responded to questions about his
representation of persons with perceived conflicts of interest. Louis
Brandeis responded to challenges by stating that he was “counsel for
the situation.”1 Some use this comment when examining problems
associated with a single lawyer representing multiple clients in the
same transaction.2 Others believe that Brandeis may have been
referring to a type of intermediary role in which lawyers attempt to
adjust the rights and interests of multiple clients with potentially
conflicting interests.3 Still, others, including Professor Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., believe that Brandeis properly recognized that service to
clients may include consideration of the interests of others.4 In this
sense, Louis Brandeis’s comments captured the perspective of those
who endorse a collaborative approach to lawyering.

Professor

and Associate Dean for Research, Texas A&M University School of Law. Thanks
to Professor Sam Levine, the Director of the Jewish Law Institute at Touro Law Center and
the Touro Law Review for inviting me to participate in Conference, the Louis D. Brandeis:
An Interdisciplinary Retrospective.
1 John P. Frank, The Legal Ethics of Louis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REV. 683, 702 (1965)
(referring to the phrase as one of the “most unfortunate phrases [Brandeis] ever causally
uttered”).
2 See John A. Walton, Conflicts for Sports and Entertainment Attorneys: The Good News,
the Bad News, and the Ugly Consequences, 5 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 259, 270-71 (1998).
3 See John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries: The Representation of Multiple
Clients in the Modern Legal Profession, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 741, 744 (1992) (suggesting
that the American Bar Association’s adoption of Model Rule 2.2 was an explicit recognition
of “the role of the lawyer as an intermediary adjusting the rights and obligations of multiple
clients with potentially conflicting interests”).
4 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyer for the Situation, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 377, 379 (2004)
(noting “law practice involves nearly infinite variations of ‘situation’ in which lawyers have
legal duties to persons other then [sic] their clients”).
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In various practice settings lawyers are increasingly practicing
collaborative law, contributing to what commentators refer to as the
“Collaborative Law Movement”5 or even the “collaborative law
revolution.”6 Although collaborative practitioners can now be found
around the world, collaborative approaches are predominately used in
the field of family law.7 This essay discusses how the practice of
collaborative divorce by family law lawyers reflects a Brandeis-like
mindset to lawyering and serving clients. After briefly reviewing the
basic structure of collaborative divorce and its advantages, this essay
concludes by illuminating a serious conflict of interest concern that
lawyers should recognize before determining that collaborative
divorce is the right approach for the client situation.
In a collaborative divorce, as in a traditional divorce, parties
are represented by their own lawyers.8 The difference with the
collaborative process is that the lawyers and the parties commit at the
outset of the representation.9 Experts in collaborative law describe
the key features of this arrangement as follows:
Both the parties and their attorneys agree,
contractually or through a stipulation filed in court, to
attempt to settle the matter without litigation or even
the threat of litigation. They promise to take a
reasoned stand on every issue, to keep discovery
informal and cooperative, and to negotiate in good
faith.

5

See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, The Organized Bar and the Collaborative Law Movement: A
Study in Professional Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 289, 334 (2008) (exploring what the
“institutionalization of the Collaborative Law Movement and the mainstream bar’s response
to CL might suggest about the American legal profession’s evolving associational structure
and ethics regime”).
6 Dafna Lavi, Can the Leopard Change His Spots?!: Reflections on the ‘Collaborative
Law’ Revolution and Collaborative Advocacy, 13 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 61, 93, 110
(2011) (arguing that collaborative law “marks a revolution in the design and reconceptualization of the role of the attorney practicing family law”).
7 See Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Family Law, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 317, 317-18
(2004); see also Phyllis Rubenstein, Collaborative Law: Effectively Resolving Conflict
Without Going to Court, 36 FALL VT. B.J. 40, 40 (2010).
8 David Hoffman & Pauline Tesler, Collaborative Law the Use of Settlement Counsel, in 1
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTICE GUIDE § 41:4 (Bette J. Roth et al. eds., 2015).
9 Terri
Harrington, Collaborative Law: A Paradigm Shift for Attorneys, in
UNDERSTANDING COLLABORATIVE FAMILY LAW: LEADING LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING THE
COLLABORATIVE PROCESS, WORKING WITH CLIENTS, AND ANALYZING THE LATEST TRENDS
(2011), 2011 WL 587390 at *1.
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The key to a collaborative law agreement is that if
either party seeks court intervention, both attorneys
must withdraw from representation.10
As Professor Robert Cochran has suggested in his seminal
article, collaborative law moves lawyers in a Brandeis-like direction,
in which―in the words of Brandeis―the lawyer’s motive is “to give
everybody, to the very best of my ability, a square deal.” 11 Generally
speaking, this is the goal of lawyers in a collaborative divorce. For
the sake of the divorcing couple, as well as the children and larger
family, collaborative divorce may unfold as a more cooperative
approach to pursuing win-win solutions, as compared to combative
litigation. As such, the collaborative approach shifts the paradigm,
transforming the lawyer’s role.12 No longer is the lawyer putting on
blinders as an adversarial advocate. Instead, the collaborative lawyer
concentrates on assisting the client and facilitating a settlement that is
acceptable to the clients.13
Although lawyers, mediators, and even courts often
encourage litigants to reach settlements in a traditional divorce, the
structure and economics of a collaborative divorce create a very
strong incentive for the parties to settle.14 As agreed at the outset of
the representation, both collaborative lawyers must resign if the
parties fail to settle.15 That means the clients must incur the expense
10

Hoffman & Tesler, supra note 8, § 41:1.
Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Collaborative Practice’s Radical Possibilities for the Legal
Profession: “[Two Lawyers and Two Clients] For the Situation,” 11 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J.
229, 230 (2010); see ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN’S LIFE 233 (1956).
12 See Harrington, supra note 9, at *1 (describing the paradigm shift in collaborative
lawyers’ work style as, “Instead of being adversarial, they are trained to be collaborative,
they agree to focus their efforts on problem-solving, and they work to seek resolutions that
address the interests of both parties without the help of the courthouse. The collaborative
paradigm gives the job of decision-making back to the clients instead of the attorneys and
the court. The collaborative process is not focused on the biggest piece of the pie or the
outcome. The process is focused on making sure everyone is heard, and that every need and
interest is valued in a safe environment with all the legal information necessary.”).
13 See Cochran, supra note 11, at 232 (suggesting that collaborative practice can help
transform law practice by helping “shift the lawyer norm from thinking primarily about
winning for a client at the expense of the other party, to thinking about reaching a resolution
that will benefit all.”).
14 Hoffman & Tesler, supra note 8, § 41:9 ; but see Luke Salava, Collaborative Divorce:
Why the Underwhelming Advance?, 32 GP SOLO 70, 70 (2015) (comparing collaborative
divorce to a traditional divorce where, if negotiations and mediation do not result in a
settlement, the lawyers are free to continue to litigate the matter on behalf of the clients).
15 Frequently
Asked Questions, NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM,
https://www.nycourts.gov/ip/collablaw/faqs.shtml#Q8 (last updated June 16, 2014).
11
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and effort of hiring new lawyers and the collaborative lawyers lose
the business. Pointing to this settlement incentive, proponents
maintain that settlements are more likely when parties use a
collaborative process.16
Collaborative lawyers also maintain that collaborative divorce
costs less than traditional representation.17 Although purported costsaving estimates vary, “the seemingly unanimous position” among
commentators is that divorces negotiated under a collaborative law
agreement “cost less in time and money than conventional,
adversarial representation.”18
In addition to saving costs, collaborative divorce also
contributes to parties considering the interests of others and
addressing those concerns from a non-adversarial perspective.19 As a
result, parties, as well as their lawyers, are more inclined to consider
what is best for the situation, including the children and the family
unit.20 Some collaborative practitioners see themselves as lawyers
for the “whole family.”21 This resembles the Brandeis approach of
attempting to resolve disputes in a manner that benefits “all of the
affected parties, rather than focusing solely on the interests of [the]
client.”22

16 Penelope Eileen Bryan, “Collaborative Divorce” Meaningful Reform or Another Quick
Fix?, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1001, 1015 (1999) (suggesting that although proponents
of collaborative divorce characterize this settlement incentive as a positive aspect of
collaborative divorce, the “lawyer’s incentive to settle the clients’ financial concerns can
compromise the interests of the weaker party, usually the wife”).
17 Luke Salava, Collaborative Divorce: The Unexpectedly Underwhelming Advance of a
Promising Solution in Marriage Dissolution, 48 FAM. L.Q. 179, 186-87 n.48 (2014)
(referring to a study conducted in Boston that describes the cost savings as follows: “The
claimed reduction in cost comes from the speediness of settlement, which collaborative
divorce can produce: whereas traditional divorces can take an average of eighteen months to
complete, a typical collaborative divorce can take a mere eighteen weeks or less to settle.
Savings can also be realized by forgoing costly discovery proceedings, depositions, writing
of memoranda, and numerous court appearances; some experts suggest such practices can
save 40% to 65% of the cost of a traditional divorce.”).
18 William H. Schwab, Collaborative Lawyering; A Closer Look at an Emerging Practice,
4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 351, 355-56 (2004).
19 See Salava, supra note 17, at 194.
20 See Salava, supra note 17, at 194-95.
21 See Cochran, supra note 11, at 237, 239 (suggesting that lawyers who speak of
themselves as representing the “whole family” should explain their role by saying “that a
100% commitment to the client has led them to think about what will be good for the other
party”).
22 Cochran, supra note 11, at 229.
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Longer term, this non-adversarial approach promises to
preserve amicable relationships between the parties.23 Having
recently attended a wedding where the parents of the bride were
divorced, I saw firsthand how an acrimonious divorce continues to
hurt family relationships for decades. With collaborative divorce, the
expectation is that parties will remain on speaking terms with less
likelihood of collateral damage for future interactions.24
Another advantage of collaborative divorce is that it promotes
a team-approach.25 Depending on the circumstances and complexity
of the divorce, non-lawyer professionals, such as licensed mental
health professionals, child specialists, and neutral financial
specialists, could provide insights and assistance.26 The inclusion of
neutral family counselors and financial advisors, as opposed to
partisan, hired-gun experts, improves the likelihood of the parties
reaching a mutually acceptable settlement.
Clearly, for the right situation, collaborative divorce has a
great deal of promise. I emphasize the phrase, “for the right
situation,” because not all parties or circumstances are suitable for a
collaborative process. For example, the collaborative divorce is
inappropriate if one party refuses to share pertinent information or
resorts to hiding assets.27 In addition, the collaboration may not be
possible if there is a power imbalance or the clients’ emotional or
psychological state prevents them from meaningful participation in
the process.28 A related concern is that the divorce judge does not
play a role and, therefore, there is no outside person to deal with
questionable conduct.29

23 Schneyer, supra note 5, at 299 (citing PAULINE H. TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW:
ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION IN DIVORCE WITHOUT LITIGATION 80-81 (2d ed. 2008)
[hereinafter “TESLER, ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION”]) (arguing that the collaborative
approach improves the likelihood that the divorce process will damage the relationships less
than adversarial litigation because the collaborative lawyer “strives to preserve the
‘relational estate,’ which includes extended-family ties, shared friendships, and the spouses’
post-divorce ability to co-parent effectively and look back on their conduct during the
divorce with self-respect”).
24 See TESLER, ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION, supra note 23, at 82.
25 Stu Webb, Collaborative Law: A Practitioner’s Perspective on its History and Current
Practice, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 155, 165 (2008).
26 Id. at 165-66 (describing the nature of assistance that non-lawyer professionals
provide).
27 See TESLER, ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION, supra note 23, at 102.
28 See TESLER, ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION, supra note 23, at 25.
29 See Cochran, supra note 11, at 240.
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When communications and the process break down in a
collaborative divorce, the parties must incur additional costs.30
Because they started with the collaborative approach, the
collaborative lawyers must resign and the clients must retain new
counsel to handle the litigation.31
Interestingly, both these advantages and disadvantages point
to a threshold issue of acting in good faith by seeking to resolve the
matter without litigation. When counseling clients, lawyers must
carefully examine the circumstances surrounding the parties and
evaluate whether the representation is suitable for collaborative
divorce.32 John Lande and Forrest S. Mosten, two dispute resolution
experts and scholars, captured this sentiment by noting that
collaborative law is “an impressive dispute resolution process that
offers significant benefits for disputants in appropriate cases.”33
They assert that “screening for appropriateness is linked to the
process of obtaining the parties’ informed consent to participate in”
the collaborative law process.34 In screening and evaluating the
circumstances, the lawyer should focus on the interests of the client
and resist any tendency to sell the collaborative law process.35
In connection with screening and evaluating appropriateness,
lawyers should also engage in a type of self-assessment and examine
their own motivations for recommending a collaborative approach.
Specifically, lawyers should resist any temptation to suggest a
collaborative process because the lawyer is tired of contentious
litigation.
As suggested by an empirical study of collaborative practice
in Canada and the United States, there is a real risk of lawyers
promoting the collaborative approach because of discomfort with
traditional litigation.36 According to the study, “[t]he most frequently
30

Schwab, supra note 18, at 359.
Schwab, supra note 18, at 358.
32 John Lande & Forrest S. Mosten, Collaborative Lawyers’ Duties to Screen the
Appropriateness of Collaborative Law and Obtain Clients’ Informed Consent to Use
Collaborative Law, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 347, 351-52, 355-56 (2010).
33 Id. at 349 (emphasis added).
34 Id. at 356, 406 (referring to two studies that raise concerns over how well collaborative
law attorneys comply with duties to screen cases for appropriateness and obtain informed
consent).
35 Id. at 357 (citing TESLER, ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION, supra note 23, at 56).
36 Dr. Julie Macfarlane, The Emerging Phenomenon of Collaborative Family Law (CFL):
A Qualitative Study of CFL Cases, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CANADA at vii, 17 (2005),
http://justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/fl-lf/famil/2005_1/pdf/2005_1.pdf.
31
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voiced reason for [lawyers] moving toward a collaborative model of
practice was an abhorrence of litigation for family matters.”37
John McShane, a leader in the collaborative law movement in
Texas, calls some family lawyers “refugees from the angst of
litigation.”38 Mr. McShane suggests that these lawyers may be
looking for a “geographical cure” to dealing with being burned out
from their experiences at the courthouse.39 Thus, they may be
pushing collaborative divorce because of their own disenchantment
with litigation. As an ethics professor, I find this is particularly
troublesome because the lawyer may not even realize how the
lawyer’s own personal interests are influencing the lawyer’s
representation of the client. In short, the desire to avoid litigation
may impact the independent judgment that the lawyer should exercise
in representing a client. Failure to recognize and address this
personal-interest conflict could violate disciplinary rules and
fiduciary principles that require lawyers act independently on behalf
of clients and not elevate lawyer interests over client interests.40
The good news is that this concern may be addressed if
lawyers obtain training on collaborative practice.41 Through training,
lawyers should learn how to screen and evaluate all circumstances to
37

Id. at 17.
Interview with John McShane, President, The Law Offices of John V. McShane, P.C.
(Mar. 1, 2016).
39 Id. (stating this is not surprising given that the father of collaborative law conceived of
the approach after suffering from “family law burnout.”); see also Schneyer, supra note 5, at
289-90 (describing the genesis of the collaborative law movement); Schwab, supra note 18,
at 355 (according to an account of the beginnings of collaborative law, Stuart Webb, a
Minnesota family lawyer, developed the collaborative approach after being besieged by “the
constant negativity of his practice”).
40 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (prohibiting a
lawyer from representation involving a concurrent conflict defined to include situations
when “there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be
materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or third
person or by a personal interest of the lawyer”) (emphasis added); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.7(b)(1)(4) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (allowing “a lawyer to represent a client if
the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent
representation to each affected client” and if “each affected client gives informed consent,
confirmed in writing”). Applying these rule provisions to a lawyer’s representation of
divorce clients, lawyers should determine if their own interest in avoiding contentious
litigation could be affecting their suggestion that clients pursue a collaborative divorce.
41 Webb, supra note 25, at 166-67 (discussing the various groups, including “[t]he
international umbrella organization,” the International Academy of Collaborative
Professionals, which provides training); see INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF COLLABORATIVE
PROFESSIONALS, https://www.collaborativepractice.com/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2016)
(providing information on introductory and advanced training programs).
38
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determine whether collaborative approach is suitable for the parties.42
Training will also help lawyers address any baggage that lawyers
may bring to the situation, including the lawyers’ own motivations in
recommending a collaborative approach.43 In short, training should
help lawyers understand the importance of knowing the client’s
situation and the lawyer knowing him or herself.
Louis Brandeis apparently recognized that representation does
not always require an adversarial model of lawyering.44 Rather, he
understood that clients can be represented effectively by lawyers
using a more collaborative tack.45 Thus, in the right situation, he
likely would applaud those who use a collaborative approach to
considering the interests of others while serving client interests.

42 See Cheryl A. Fletcher, Judith Judge & Veronique Liem, Collaborative Practice, 85
MICH. B.J. 25, 26 (2006) (discussing the screening processes for lawyers to use the
collaborative approach).
43 See John Lande, Possibilities for Collaborative Law: Ethics and Practice of Lawyer
Disqualification and Process Control in a New Model of Lawyering, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1315,
1329 (2003) (discussing how lawyers can pressure their clients into a collaborative
approach).
44 See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Louis D. Brandeis and the Lawyer Advocacy System, 40
PEPP. L. REV. 351, 361 (2013) (discussing how Brandeis recognized that lawyers must work
together in order to reach a just result).
45 Id.
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